University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2007

On Avoiding Foundational Questions - A Reply to Andrew Coan
Cass R. Sunstein

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Cass R. Sunstein, Response, "On Avoiding Foundational Questions - A Reply to Andrew Coan", 60 Stanford
Law Review 241 (2007).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

ON AVOIDING FOUNDATIONAL
QUESTIONS

A REPLY TO ANDREW COAN
Cass R. Sunstein*
In both legal practice and legal scholarship, it is sometimes best to proceed
without attempting to answer the foundational questions. Originalists can
inquire into the original public meaning of the Equal Protection Clause without
defending originalism. Economic analysts of law can ask how to promote
efficiency without defending the view that the law should aim at efficiency. It
would be useful to know how utilitarians and retributivists would approach
punitive damage awards, without resolving the question whether we should be
utilitarians or retributivists. Here, as elsewhere, a division of labor makes good
sense. Some people (or some works) take certain judgments for granted and
proceed from there; other people (or other works) try to resolve the deepest
questions.
On some occasions, the Supreme Court seems to have taken account of the
risk or reality of public outrage.' Surprisingly, there has been little analysis of
the question whether the Court has been right to do so. (This may be the only
area of public law in which the positive literature 2 is more developed than the
normative literature!) It would seem to be useful to begin by asking how those
with different understandings of constitutional interpretation might approach
the problem. At first glance, originalists would seem unlikely to approach
public outrage in the same way as "moral readers"; 3 committed
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of

Political Science, University of Chicago.
1. See, e.g., Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (declining to decide whether bans on
racial intermarriage are unconstitutional).
2. For an early treatment, see Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The
Supreme Court as National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957). For a recent and broadly
compatible discussion, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL

EQUALITY

(2006). For a valuable

collection, see PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY (Nathaniel Persily et al.
eds., forthcoming 2008).
3. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
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consequentialists 4 are likely to have a distinctive view. But perhaps these
conclusions are too crude. Perhaps the distinctions are less sharp than we
suppose. Perhaps an exploration of different approaches will reveal some
surprises.
In my essay on the question, 5 I attempted to explore how different judges,
with different approaches to constitutional law, might think about two separate
reasons for judicial consideration of outrage: the consequentialist and the
epistemic. Perhaps judges should consider outrage with the thought that if they
fail to do so, the consequences of their rulings might turn out to be very bad. Or
perhaps judges should consider outrage on the ground that if the public feels so
intensely, their own conclusions might well be wrong. Learned Hand famously
wrote that "[t]he spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is
right," 6 and perhaps judges should pay attention to public outrage out of
modesty about their own conclusions. Not surprisingly, the consequentialist
and epistemic arguments will be received differently by those with different
approaches to constitutional meaning.
In his illuminating response, 7 Andrew Coan makes a number of valuable
suggestions, but two seem to me primary. The first is that it is difficult to take a
position on the relevance of consequences without taking a position on
consequentialism. 8 Avoiding any such position, my own argument does have a
minimalist character; it explores how those with different approaches will
respond to outrage without taking a stand on those approaches. Coan asks,
reasonably enough: how can we know how judges should proceed without
knowing what approach is right? 9 Coan's second suggestion is that a good
reason to take account of public outrage is to show respect for democracy.' 0 In
his view, the consequentialist and epistemic arguments are incomplete;
democratic considerations should be primary." Let me take up these
suggestions in sequence.
Coan is right to say that we cannot know whether to consider consequences
without knowing whether to be consequentialists. But the debate over
consequentialism raises many complex questions, and surely it is useful to see
how those with different approaches to constitutional law might think about
CONSTITUTION (1996).
4. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME
OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006).
5. See Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should
Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REv. 155 (2007).
6. LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 189, 190 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. enlarged 1960).

7. Andrew Coan, Well, Should They? A Response to If People Would Be Outraged by
Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REv. 213 (2007).
8. Id. at 216-17.
9. Id.
10. Id. at233-39.
11. Id.
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outrage without answering the question whether judges should accept
consequentialism. Without making a general defense of consequentialism, I did
mean both to identify and to raise questions about Kantian adjudication,
captured in the idea that judges should interpret the law without paying
attention to the effects of their rulings. 12 In my view, Kantian adjudication is
most naturally defended on (second-order) consequentialist grounds, with the
suggestion that things would be much worse ifjud es routinely asked whether
their conclusion would produce bad consequences.
It is easy to understand the deontological claim that people should be
treated as ends, not means. It is not so easy to understand the view that judicial
consideration of consequences would run afoul of this claim. 14 In short, I
attempt to give reasons to reject Kantian adjudication without rejecting
Kantianism, and without mounting anything like a full-scale defense of
consequentialism.
Coan has a separate argument. By itself, the idea of consequentialism is
insufficiently helpful. We need a theory of value to identify consequences as
good, and to decide how they should be weighted. (Is it a good consequence if
women are allowed to have abortions? How good?) Coan and I are in
agreement on this point, which means that a lot of work has to be done to give
15
content to the consequentialist argument for considering public outrage.
Nonetheless, we can imagine a range of cases in which diverse people might be
able to agree that consequences would be bad. An easy case would be a judicial
ruling resulting in the death of many American soldiers. Moreover, those who
believe that the Constitution is best construed to require recognition of samesex marriages might well hesitate to rule to that effect if the consequence would
be to inflame hostility against gay and lesbian couples (while also dooming a
slow but real movement toward according legal rights to such couples).
The simple point is that in a range of cases, it is unnecessary to resolve
hard questions of value in order to recognize certain consequences as bad. Coan
is right to say that consequentialism needs a theory of value to get off the
ground. But in many cases, we can agree that some results are bad and others
good, without attempting to resolve our disagreements about the foundational
questions.
Coan's more ambitious suggestion is that the consequentialist and
epistemic arguments miss something of great importance.1 6 In his view, people
are entitled to govern themselves. When judges pay attention to public outrage,
they show respect for the ideal of self-government. He contends that the
consequentialist and epistemic arguments slight democratic considerations,

12. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 164-66.
13. Id. at 166, 178-79.
14. I do attempt, however, to make some sense of this view. See id.

15. Id. at 172-75.
16. Id. at 175-76.
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from which their force derives; indeed, such considerations turn out to be "a
necessary prerequisite for
determining when and whether we should find those
17
arguments persuasive."
Coan is right to say that consequentialists might well conclude that selfgovernment matters a great deal, and that invalidation of a judgment of the
elected branches counts as a bad consequence. I will return to this point. But
the epistemic argument must be dealt with separately. There are many accounts
of democracy, but one is emphatically epistemic: by virtue of their numbers,
the people are more likely to be right.18 A softer version of this proposition
would be comparative: by virtue of their numbers, the people are more likely to
be right, on many matters, than are small groups of people, such as federal
judges. 19 My own discussion, focused on the narrow question of public outrage
directed at judicial decisions, is intended to cast some light on the more general
question why and under what conditions the epistemic defense of democracy
might be right or wrong. 20 If, for example, people suffer from a systematic
bias, and hence are more likely to be wrong than right, the epistemic argument
loses its force.
Coan's positive suggestion is that democracy provides an independent
reason for judges to attend to public outrage. 2 1 In the end, he might be right.
But the claim runs into immediate problems. What if there is good reason to
believe that the people are likely to be wrong on some question of fact or
morality? What if the public seeks to restrict speech, or to discriminate against
a religious minority, because of some kind of systematic bias? In any case, we
should not identify the idea of "democracy" with whatever happens to emerge
from the political branches. What if members of those branches are attempting
to entrench themselves, at the expense of democracy? At a minimum, the idea
of democracy comes with its own internal morality, and judges may well be
vindicating that morality when they invalidate laws in democracy's name. If so,
does judicial attention to public outrage promote democracy, rightly conceived,
or does it do the opposite?
Suppose that a state has banned certain people from voting or restricted
their ability to influence the political process. Suppose that the ban or the
restriction is challenged on constitutional grounds, and that (most or many)
people would be quite outraged if the Court accepted the challenge. Or suppose
17. Coan, supra note 7, at 234.
18. See Bernard Grofman & Scott L. Feld, Rousseau's General Will: A Condorcetian
Perspective, 82 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 567 (1988).
19. On diversity and truth, see SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF
DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES (2007).
20. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 186-90.
21. Coan, supra note 7, at 233-39. Coan urges that an exploration of public outrage
helps to show the problematic relationship between originalism and democracy. Id. at 219
n.24. I agree with his general conclusion; for more on the problems with originalism, see
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG
FOR AMERICA (2006).
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that a state has prohibited certain forms of political dissent, and the Court is
asked to strike down the prohibition on constitutional grounds, even though
invalidation would provoke outrage. The problem should be familiar. If
democracy is our lodestar, we might well favor certain judicial invalidations,
and in such cases, outrage is neither here nor there. This point raises an obvious
22
question: which invalidations? John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust
might be taken as providing one set of answers, and there are others. 2 3 My only
suggestion is that the idea of democracy, as such, does not counsel attention to
public outrage when the public is outraged by judicial efforts to protect
democracy's internal morality.
Suppose, however, that invalidations cannot be connected with democratic
ideals. Suppose, for example, that judges are asked to strike down a law that
bans sexually explicit literature, or that allows the government to eavesdrop on
ordinary conversations, or that mandates school prayer. Even if democratic
self-government is not at risk, it is possible that judicial invalidation in such
circumstances is justified by the right conception of constitutional
democracy 4-including the set of individual rights, or political principles, that
might be thought to give democracy itself its point. If this is so, judicial
attention to public outrage would be perverse. Judges would be creating a kind
of public veto on decisions that are entailed by the best understanding of the
document.
These points seem to me to raise real questions about Coan's argument.
We should be able to understand the view that judges should consider public
outrage on the ground that it is a clue that the judicial understanding is not
correct (the epistemic argument). We should also be able to understand the
view that judicial failure to consider public outrage might produce either
counterproductive rulings or overall harm (the consequentialist argument).
What is harder to understand is the view that judges should invoke the idea of
self-government in order to decline to rule in accordance with the best
understanding of constitutional democracy.
I do not deny that the democratic ideal might give judges reason to hesitate
in the face of intense popular convictions in some cases, and that in some of
those cases the right to self-government is doing real work. But in such cases,
the insult to self-government should be seen as a bad consequence-one that
consequentialist judges should be willing to take into account. Recall that
consequentialism needs a theory of value, and it is certainly possible for
consequentialists to recognize an assortment of heterogeneous goods, 25 of
which the right to self-government is emphatically one.
22. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

(1980).
23. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).

24. See DWORKIN, supra note 3.
25. See Amartya Sen, Fertility and Coercion, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1035, 1038-39 (1996)
(noting possibility of considering rights violations as part of assessment of consequences).
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I do not mean to suggest that judges should feel free to understand the
Constitution's broad terms in a way that fits with their preferred conception of
political morality. In my view, judges should adopt a form of second-order
perfectionism, 26 based on an understanding of their own institutional limits. A
minimalist approach, including frequent respect for the outcomes of political
processes, seems to me an attractive form of second-order perfectionism. 27 And
in the end, the epistemic argument for judicial attention to public outrage does
turn out to be weak-but in rare but important cases, the consequentialist
argument has considerable force not merely for minimalists, but also for others
who accept many different approaches to constitutional law. 28 If this
conclusion is correct, then we might be able to accept that argument, in those
rare but important cases, even as we avoid the foundational questions.

26. See Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 2867
(2007).
27. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE

SUPREME COURT (1999).
28. See Sunstein, supra note 5.
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